Fake candidates and fake recruiters: hiring after Binance

Binance was breached through a supply-chain compromise and a fake job interview. What European employers should check, and what NIS2 and the ZKI require.

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According to Binance’s 3 November write-up, the record theft on 29 October came through two entry points: a tampered Homebrew installed by an engineer in June, and a fake job interview in September that got a second engineer to download a malicious “assignment”. Nobody was hired. That is the fake-recruiter direction. North Korea’s other documented route is the reverse: fake candidates who get hired as remote IT workers. In Czechia, the Critical Infrastructure Act (ZKI) already requires designated critical infrastructure entities to check the identity and criminal record of anyone with direct or remote access to their systems.

What happened at Binance (from Binance’s own write-up)

On 29 October 2026, attackers took about $6.3bn (Binance’s figure) from Binance. It is the largest crypto theft on record. The FBI attributed it to North Korea’s TraderTraitor (also known as Lazarus). North Korea denies it.

Binance published its initial findings on 3 November. They describe a campaign with two entry points, built over five months.

June: a tampered Homebrew

An engineer in Wallet DevOps searched for a popular AI coding tool and installed a tampered copy of Homebrew, a common software installer. Binance replaced the device and rotated the credentials, but the wallet team stayed exposed.

September: the fake job interview

A second engineer was contacted on a legitimate job-hunting platform by someone posing as a “Project Director”. He had a video interview with a fake HR person, then a chat-app interview with a fake “CEO”. He was then asked to download an “assignment”. It contained a malicious code repository, and he opened it on his work computer.

October: an internal AI tool and the signing service

On 20 October, working from the second engineer’s computer, the attacker used an internal AI tool to gain control over two more engineers. One of them held a container-deployment permission token. On 29 October the attacker used those stolen credentials to deploy a container and reach the internal wallet signing service. Outflows began at 20:05 UTC.

Binance paused withdrawals and resumed them in phases from 1 November. About $2.85bn was frozen or intercepted. Losses were covered from SAFU, the Futures insurance fund and Binance’s corporate treasury.

Richard Teng, Binance co-CEO, told Bloomberg: “This was not a single mistake or a single breach. It was a campaign built over many months.”

Two points matter for employers. Nobody was hired at Binance. And background screening alone would not have stopped this attack.

Two directions, one channel: fake recruiters and fake candidates

Hiring is an attack surface in both directions. A fake recruiter reaches the people you already employ. A fake candidate applies for the roles you have open. Both use the hiring process as the way in.

Fake recruiter or interview lureFake candidate or remote IT worker
TargetYour existing staffYour open roles
GoalMalware, credentialsA salary, access, data, extortion
Documented byBinance write-up, 3 Nov 2026 (one of its two entry points). WaterPlum (“Contagious Interview”) joint advisory, 18 Sep 2026, co-issued by the BfV and BND, and flagged by NÚKIBUS Department of Justice, 30 Jun 2025. Microsoft on “Jasper Sleet”, 30 Jun 2025. Google Threat Intelligence Group, 1 Apr 2025 (expansion into Europe). BfV security advisory 02/2024
ControlStaff awareness, especially for privileged staff. No “test tasks” that install softwareIdentity and liveness checks, CV cross-checks, checks on the equipment shipping address, screening in proportion to the role

The other Binance entry point, the tampered Homebrew, is a supply-chain issue. It is not a hiring control, and we do not pretend it is.

Is Europe a target?

Yes. The public record in Europe now covers both directions.

  • Germany, fake candidates. The domestic intelligence service BfV said in its security advisory 02/2024 (1 October 2024) that German firms already had contracts with North Korean IT workers, hired through Fiverr, Upwork and freelancer.com.
  • Germany, fake recruiters. The BfV co-issued the joint WaterPlum advisory of 18 September 2026 with the BND and partner agencies. According to German media, it confirmed several affected companies and individuals in Germany.
  • Czechia. According to Czech media reports from September 2026, the national cyber agency NÚKIB warned about a North Korean campaign that abuses recruitment processes. That warning concerns fake recruiters, not fake candidates.
  • Europe as a whole. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group reported on 1 April 2025 that North Korean IT workers were expanding into Europe. Eleven governments, including the United States, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, issued a joint alert on North Korean IT workers on 31 July 2026.

In Czechia, the pattern was visible earlier in everyday hiring. In April 2023 Petr Moroz warned on Czech Television (ČT24, 27 April 2023) that fake remote IT candidates with forged European documents were applying to Czech companies, with a trail leading to Dandong on the China–North Korea border.

What the law already asks for

For employers covered by these laws, personnel security is a legal requirement. The Czech act is the most specific: it names identity and criminal-record checks. Four pieces of law are relevant.

  • Czechia: the Critical Infrastructure Act (ZKI, 266/2025 Sb.). Section 17 applies to designated critical infrastructure entities. They must require proof of identity and a criminal-record extract from workers on the essential service and from anyone entrusted with direct or remote access (§ 17(2)(a)). The reliability check also covers people applying for a job (§ 17(1)). Read more on what the ZKI requires.
  • EU: NIS2. Article 21(2)(i) lists human resources security among the risk-management measures that covered entities must take. See our overview of NIS2 and ZKI deadlines.
  • Germany: the NIS2 implementation act (NIS2UmsuCG). It has been in force since 6 December 2025.
  • Slovakia: Act 366/2024 Z.z. It amends the Cybersecurity Act (69/2018 Z.z.) to transpose NIS2 and has been in force since 1 January 2025.

The practical point is evidence. An auditor will ask who was checked, when and against which sources, and that includes contractors and other external staff with access.

Check your hiring for both doors

Ten questions to put to your HR and security leads. A “no” or a “not sure” marks a door that may be open.

Door 1: fake recruiters reaching your people

  1. Do staff with privileged access know that a job offer or interview can be an attack?
  2. Is there a rule against running code, repositories or “test assignments” from outside parties on work devices?
  3. Can staff report a suspicious recruiter approach without embarrassment, and does someone act on the report?

Door 2: fake candidates applying for your roles

  1. Do you verify a candidate’s identity against a document, with a liveness check, before granting any access?
  2. Do you cross-check the CV against independent sources, such as past employers and education records?
  3. Do you check criminal records in every country where the candidate has lived, not only your own?
  4. Do you check that the address where equipment is shipped matches the person you hired?

Contractors and external staff

  1. Do you know which contractors and supplier staff have direct or remote access to your systems?
  2. Are they checked to the same standard as your own employees in comparable roles?

Evidence

  1. Could you show an auditor who was checked, when and against which sources?

If several answers were “no”, talk to Petr, or start with a free Basic account.

Listen: Petr Moroz on lokál hosť

On 29 October 2026, the day of the Binance theft, Soitron’s podcast lokál hosť published a conversation with Petr Moroz. The episode is titled “Keď uchádzač o prácu neexistuje: falošné AI identity a nové hrozby” (When the job applicant does not exist: fake AI identities and new threats). Hosts Marianna Sádecká and Silvia Strežová talk with Petr for 1 hour 35 minutes about North Korean IT workers inside European firms, fake AI identities in video interviews, and why the most expensive incident often starts with someone the company hired itself. The conversation is in Slovak.

Listen on Spotify or watch on YouTube.

Further reading

FAQ

Did a North Korean get hired at Binance?

No. According to Binance’s 3 November write-up, the attackers got in through two entry points: a tampered Homebrew installation, which is a supply-chain compromise, and a fake job interview aimed at an existing engineer.

Would background screening have stopped it?

No. Neither entry point was a hire. Screening addresses the other door: fake candidates who apply for your roles.

Who must be checked under the ZKI?

Section 17 of the Czech Critical Infrastructure Act applies to designated critical infrastructure entities. They must require proof of identity and a criminal-record extract from workers on the essential service and from anyone entrusted with direct or remote access (§ 17(2)(a)). The reliability check also covers people applying for a job (§ 17(1)).

What is a laptop farm?

A location where someone hosts company laptops on behalf of remote workers, so that the workers appear to be in the country where they were hired. On 30 June 2025 the US Department of Justice announced searches of 29 known or suspected laptop farms across 16 states.

How do I check a remote candidate’s identity?

Verify the identity document and run a liveness check, cross-check the CV against independent sources, and check the address where equipment is shipped.